Introduction
Pride is an ambiguous quality. 1 We praise those who take pride in themselves and their work, while criticizing the proud if they seem arrogant and egotistical. 2 In his triadic analysis of moral virtue as the mean between two vices in book four of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle carves out a positive role for pride-megalopsukhia, proper pride, 3 is elevated, in 1 For comments and suggestions, I am grateful to the editors of this volume and the colloquium participants, as well as audiences at Pomona College, Princeton University, and Yale University. I also wish to thank Agnes G. Callard, James Ker, Kathleen McCarthy, A.D. Macro, and Suzanne Obdrzalek for commenting on drafts of this chapter. 2 The most recent philosophical analysis of pride known to me is Kristjánsson's spirited defense of 'pridefulness' as a necessary attendant of self-respect, which in turn is generally agreed by moral philosophers to be a condition of a good life.
3 Megalopsukhia is discussed in EN 1123a34-1125a35. megalopsukhia as consisting of greatness, self-knowledge and a general concern with honor which he terms 'pridefulness' and distinguishes from 'simple pride', an 'episodic emotion of self-satisfaction ' (2002, 105) . However, imperfect conceptual fits are often necessary in order to allow cross-cultural comparisons. The following definition of pride in the OED demonstrates a sufficient degree of overlap with Aristotle's description to allow us to think of megalopsukhia as a quality closely yelena baraz contrast with mikropsukhia and khaunotês, the lack and excess respectively. Where an individual belongs within this spectrum of pride, arrogance, and undue humility is determined by his relationship to megala 'great things'. It is not, however, one's inherent greatness, but rather the relationship between a man's own estimation of his claim to greatness and an objective evaluation of his worth that plays the decisive role.
4 Pride, positively conceived, then, exemplifies the proper alignment between internal perception and externally assigned worth and, in practical terms, results in correct expectation of honor on the part of the proud man.
5 A claim to greater things than can be externally validated results in arrogance and vanity; 6 an underestimation of one's deserts is, to Aristotle, even more damning: it leads to the vice of lack, a failure of spirit, mikropsukhia. While Aristotle's analysis is constructed to serve his larger philosophical goals, the ambivalent moral status of pride-like qualities, inherent in his triadic division, 7 can be extended more broadly to their status within the Greek conceptual framework, given the existence of a number of words that, depending on the context, can designate one's sense of self-worth as both positive and negative, e.g. phronêma, phronêsis, onkos, and megalophrosunê. 8 My concern in this chapter is based on the fact that, in contrast to Aristotle's analysis, the Romans appear to have no word that expresses a positive conception of pride.
9 Among the group of words relating related to English pride: 'A consciousness or feeling of what is befitting or due to oneself or one's position, which prevents a person from doing what he considers to be beneath him or unworthy of him; esp. as a good quality, legitimate, 'honest', or 'proper pride', self-respect; also as a mistaken or misapplied feeling, 'false pride' ' (OED s.v. B I 3a) . 4 EN 1123b1-2: δ κε δ μεγαλ ψυ ς ε ναι μεγ λων α τ ν ι ν ι ς ν· Note the emphasis on the equivalence of self-evaluation and externally verifiable reality, emphasized by using ι ν for the former and ι ς for the latter, and placing them side by side. 5 The issues surrounding the interpretation of Aristotle's description of megalopsukhos are helpfully summarized by Crisp 2006, 174-177. 6 Khaunotês, the term that Aristotle uses, is metaphorical and rare: the image is vanity as porousness, one's inability to realize how much of one's content is empty air. This quality can in turn lead to its possessor's becoming a huperoptês and a hubristês (on hubris see Fisher 1992 and the response by Cairns 1996).
7 Such a division proves impossible for justice, which has only one attendant negative quality, injustice. On this issue see Young 2006 with further bibliography. 8 LSJ s.vv. 9 On the reasons for negative views of pride in modern discourse see Kristjánsson 2002, 111-135 , who attempts to refute all the objections to the quality as incompatible with being a moral and virtuous person. See esp. 2002, 130-131 on the influence of Christian ideas.
